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Globalisation and economic rationalism have come to be associated 
with a wholesale attack on vital government services, jobs and 
working conditions, and there is a debate inside the Australian labour 
movement over what to do. Most of those opposed to the effects of 
globalisation see the nation state as the only defence working people 
have against the power of market forces, and appeal to the Labor 
Party to shift back towards its traditional orientation to protectionism 
and state-directed economic development. However there has long 
been another, albeit minority, current on the left which rejects both 
protectionism and free trade as bourgeois economic strategies 
benefiting, not the working class, but rival groups of Australian 
capitalists: in the words ofMick Considine, once the MHR for Barrier 
(NSW), "It is over the surplus value that is wrung from the working 
class in the place where they are exploited that the importers and the 
manufacturers quarrel." 1 It was with this in mind that last year I 
looked into some of the early debates within the Labor Party on free 
trade and protectionism and the process by which Labor moved 
towards protectionism as part of my History Honours thesis on "The 
decline offree trade in Australian politics, 1901-1909''.2 
According to the traditional account, it was Prime Minister Alfred 
Deakin's policy of New Protection that was decisive in shifting Labor 
policy. Deakin promised that manufacturers protected by higher 
tariffs would be forced to share the benefits with workers and farmers, 
and the famous Harvester decision of 1907 seemed to fulfil the 
promise. Labor wrote New Protection into its platform at the July 
1908 federal conference, thus, it is argued, accepting protection.] 
W.K. Hancock wrote of Labor's free traders that, "Deakin's invention 
of a device which seemed to give direct protection to wages, turned 
them from hesitating converts into ardent testifiers and missionaries" 
of protection. 4 And in an otherwise subtle biography of George 
Pearce, John Merritt wrote, that: 
After the 1908 Brisbane conference, the fiscal question never again 
bothered the Federal Labour Party. The decision to support protection 
was loyally accepted by all members - further proof that the 
inevitable was reco gnised and perhaps an indication that had Watson 
and other leading protectionists chosen to force the issue it could 
have been settled earlier.' 
This paper will argue that these assertions are contradicted by 
the historical evidence. While Labor opinion did shift from 1901 to 
1908, the party was divided and equivocal on protection until around 
1914 and did not become unambiguously protectionist until 1919. 
Indeed, far from endorsing protection, the 1908 federal conference 
saw a backlash against it. 
The sheer length and depth of Labor's commitment to 
protectionism makes it difficult to imagine popular anti-protectionism 
within the early party. Yet in 1901, Labor had a substantial free trade 
minority, and Labor free traders played a significant role in shaping 
both tariff policy and national politics more broadly. At least four of 
the nine members of Andrew Fisher's 1908-9 cabinet were free 
traders: William Morris Hughes, Senator George Pearce, Hugh 
Mahon and Josiah Thomas.6 In Britain at the time, free trade was 
almost a religion in the Labour Party, given its associations with 
cheap food and clothing, and the earlier struggle against the 
Com Laws and Tory privilege.7 In 1901, most state Labor 
organisations refused to support either free trade or protection, leaving 
it to the individual MP to vote as they saw fit, protectionist Victoria 
being the exception. 
Today we tend to think of tariff policy as having just one role, 
the protection of an industry from overseas competition, or, 
conversely, the opening of the Australian market to imports in order 
to ensure the international competitiveness of local industries. 
However, in 190 I, there were three dimensions to the debates over 
tariffs: taxation, industry protection and class. For most colonies 
before federation, especially Victoria, tariffs were the source of much 
government revenue, and a high level of revenue was vital for the 
development of railways, ports, bridges, telegraphic services and 
other vital elements of infrastructure to the point where in 1897, the 
total revenue of the Australian colonial governments was a third of 
that of the British government.s However, while tariffs in part 
facilitated economic development, they were also a tax, raising the 
price of imported goods and burdening those industries and those 
people who were expected to pay them. Thus in all colonies, there 
were from time to time conflicts between those who wanted to raise 
tariffs to finance more government activities, and those who preferred 
"retrenchment" to reduce the tax burden. There were also sectional 
conflicts over what commodities should be taxed, and sometimes 
this involved class conflict. For instance, tariffs on tea and kerosene 
were popular with the well-off because the burden was placed mostly 
on the working class, which resented them for the same reason. 
There were four sources of free trade opinion within the pre-
federation labour movement. Firstly there was the impact on self-
educated workers of the ideological dominance of free trade amongst 
academic economists, British politicians, and in NSW, the 
mainstream press. NSW Labor MP William Morris Hughes reflected 
this when he declared that, "Free-trade does not profess to be a 
remedy; it simply professes to be ... the natural order of things."9 
However this was not a doctrine to appeal to a party that was formed 
and built out of working-class discontent with the way things were, 
and which had set out to use the state machine to change things. 
Secondly, there were the small farmers whose prices were partly set 
by the world market, but who paid higher prices for farm machinery. 
Third were both employed miners and small mine-owners, for whom 
tariffs meant higher prices and threatened jobs rather than protecting 
them. The miners of Broken Hill and North Queensland elected Labor 
free traders to represent them in parliament, and West Australian 
Labor MHR Hugh Mahon summed up their approach in 1901 when 
he declared: 
I do not consider it any function of government to rob me in order to 
put money into the pockets of capitalists. I do not consider it is any 
function of government to foster a factory in Footscray and close 
down a mine in Western Australia ... 10 
NSW Premier, George Reid, had given free trade a considerable 
radical veneer in the mid-I 890s when he tried to introduce income 
and land taxes as part of a package to cut tariffs. The Legislative 
Council's refusal to pass most of his measures, and his violent 
campaign against the Council, which promised to break its power, 
added to his radical image. But by the time Reid moved to 
federal politics as leader of the national Freetrade party, he 
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had ditched all his radicalism, rejecting land and income taxes and 
eventually redefining his party as anti-socialist and anti-Labor. Where 
Reid's Premiership had rested on Labor support, his shift to the right 
in federal politics brought him more and more into conflict with 
Labor, ultimately undermining the free trade current within Labor. 
Where Reid now promoted the revenue tariff as a legitimate method 
for raising funds for government, Labor free traders were uniformly 
hostile to it as a burden on the working class. As George Pearce 
constantly reminded people, Labor's fiscal policy was for direct 
taxation through income and land taxes. II 
As well as a free trade current, Labor also had a large number of 
fiscal atheists, people who refused to choose between free trade and 
protection. This indifferentism was underpinned by two compelling 
observations. The first was that strife between free trade and 
protection had split the party and made it helpless in New South 
Wales in the early 1890s. It would be difficult to exaggerate the 
sensitivity within the entire Labor party on this point, and it was one 
ofthe factors which discouraged Labor protectionists from pushing 
the party to adopt a protectionist platform. The second observation 
was that neither fiscal policy had been of any benefit to the workers 
during the recent Great Depression. However unemployment had 
been highest in protectionist Victoria, leading Scott Bennett, a 
Victorian MLA, to express his scepticism at Labor's 1905 federal 
conference: 
... whilst he had to vote with Victoria in this matter he was a fiscal 
atheist. The condition of the workers had not improved under 
Protection in Victoria, nor had it advanced in countries where they 
had Free-trade.!2 
Many, perhaps most, Labor politicians regarded the fiscal debate as 
being of second rank importance. J.H. Catts declared: 
I am strong neither on free-trade nor protection. I do not think that 
the great problem which confronts Australia and other countries to-
day is so much one as to increasing production or wealth as it is of 
securing a more equitable distribution of the wealth that is already 
produced.!3 
The first Australian tariff was introduced by Customs Minister 
Charles Kingston in October 1901, and MPs debated virtually every 
single tariff proposed, sometimes at great length. While Labor was 
divided over free trade and protection, it 
... was united and solid against purely revenue duties, and took steps 
in caucus to select a list of such items upon which to vote as a party. 
In all sixteen items were agreed to, including tea and kerosene, cotton 
goods, etc. - all items which could not be produced in Australia as 
yet, and duties upon which pressed heavily upon the workers.!4 
Indeed Labor MPs decided to vote solidly for reduced duties 
once it was apparent that far more revenue would be raised than 
strictly necessary.15 Labor concern over items for household 
consumption saw duties halved on arrowroot, bananas, blue, cocoa 
and chocolate, oatmeal, mustard, salt, and common soap; while duties 
were cut by a third on biscuits, candles, jams, jellies, and condensed 
milk. 
One of the most revealing arguments was over proposals from 
the Protectionist government of Edmund Barton for a tax on tea. It 
was supported by conservative Freetraders from Victoria, New South 
Wales and South Australia, who wanted the revenue for their st\ltes 
and were attracted by the possibility of spreading the taxation load 
"across all classes". Opposed to the tax were Labor, and radicals 
from both the Freetrade and Protectionist parties, who opposed its 
heavy burden on workers and the poor. The most significant feature 
of the vote, says historian Yvonne Larsson, was the way "it 
provided guidelines for the future division of the House when 
the fusion of the non-Labor groups took place in 1909."16 The 
debate was eerily like the modem debates about the GS T, with Labor 
opposing consumption taxes and most bourgeois politicians 
supporting them. According to Larsson, the Labor party voted with 
the Freetrade party in 50.39% of divisions, using its numbers to 
reduce duties and reduce the impact on working class people, small 
farmers and mining companies. I? 
Deakin proposed New Protection to overcome this class-based 
suspicion of protectionism. The idea of new protection-linking 
minimum wages and conditions to protection of local industries-
had first been mooted in the early 1890s by Victorian protectionists, 18 
though little had been done. But in 1906, with Victorian 
manufacturers up in arms about their sufferings at the hands of foreign 
competitors, Deakin moved to put the idea firmly at the centre of his 
political strategy. Deakin was specifically concerned that the 
American International Harvester combine was dumping agricultural 
machinery in the hope capturing the Australian market by driving 
local manufacturers out of business. Protectionists wanted an 
increased tariff, but many in the Labor Party argued that this would 
hurt farmers and give local manufacturers a huge bonus. According 
to Deakin's biographer, JA La Nauze, Labor would only agree to a 
higher tariff if the benefits were shared with farmers and workers, 
and if the tariff increase was confined to agricultural machinery. In 
April 1906, Deakin declared, "Not only do we seek protection at the 
ports, but as a Liberal party we favour the new protection ... which 
has as its motto justice between class and class."!9 The formula 
adopted was ingenious. A Customs (Agricultural Machinery) Bill 
was passed, which substantially raised tariffs, and hence the price of 
imported machinery. At the same time, an Excise (Agricultural 
Machinery) Bill was passed, which imposed an equivalent excise on 
locally made agricultural machinery, raising the price an identical 
percentage on locally made machinery. The Excise could be remitted 
to manufacturers who paid fair and reasonable wages, as determined 
by the Arbitration Court or a state wages board. Then and only then 
would the manufacturer benefit from the increased tariff. 
The immense, potential significance of New Protection became 
clear in November 1907 when Arbitration Court judge Higgins 
brought down the Harvester decision, which determined the minimum 
level of wages that Victorian agricultural implements manufacturer, 
HV McKay, would have to pay to benefit from the special tariff. 
Higgins' historic decision set a minimum wage of seven shillings a 
day, well above the wage rates paid to most manual workers at the 
time, and equal to the longstanding claim of many trade unions for a 
restoration of the seven shillings rate workers had come to expect 
before the crash of the 1890s. According to John Rickard: 
The new protection had not been a primary interest of the labor party 
during 1906 in either parliament or the electorate ... By the following 
year labor interest in the subject was increasing ... then in November 
1907 Higgins handed down the Harvester judgment, and this sealed 
the matter as far as the labour movement was concerned. Not only 
did new protection "work", but with Higgins on the bench it seemed 
much more than just a satisfactory method of filling the gaps left by 
the State systems ... In the party's tradition of pragmatism the focus 
for labor attention now became the speedy extension of the new 
protection formula to all protected industries.20 
Higgins' decision ga1vanised Labor and trade union opinion, and 
created immense excitement about the possibilities of New 
Protection. In 1908, JH Catts, the Labor MP for the Sydney electorate 
of Cook and a fiscal atheist, declared that "it was going to 
revolutionise the Christian world", and that by its means "the ideas 
of socialism were very nearly approached."2! Higgins' decision came 
down in the middle of the debates on the new, protectionist 
tariff schedule proposed by Sir William Lyne in August 1907. 
According to Larsson, Labor's attitude to the Lyne tariff was 
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very different from its approach six years earlier. There was 
"no ... Labour interest in the 'breakfast table' items as there had been 
in 1901-2."22 Labor support for the Protectionists in divisions rose 
from 40% in 1901-2 to 90%,23 reflecting the confidence of most 
Labor MPs that New Protection would deliver benefits to workers 
in manufacturing.24 
This confidence was to be betrayed. Three days after parliament 
was prorogued having delivered the higher tariffs Lyne wanted, the 
High Court struck down the Excise (Agricultural Implements) Act, 
invalidating the Harvester judgment. There had been just seven 
months of New Protection euphoria. Labor's 1908 federal conference 
took place about a fortnight later and delegates were very angry. 
Their primary concern was to reverse the High Court decision and 
ensure that the Commonwealth had the power to determine minimum 
conditions in protected industries. In the new Fighting Platform 
passed in 1908, "The New Protection" is listed second (after 
"Maintenance of White Australia") and it is explained in the General 
Platform as "Amendment of Constitution to ensure effective Federal 
legislation for New Protection and Arbitration".25 Since there was 
no need to amend the Constitution to provide protection, since the 
manufacturers already had their protection, it is clear that when the 
conference talked about New Protection it was placing its primary 
emphasis on the protection of workers in already protected 
industries.26 That understanding is clear from the debate. There is no 
discussion at all of the fiscal issue; the debate is wholly about the 
virtues of giving the Commonwealth power over the states in 
industrial matters - a proposition that William Holman from New 
South Wales and some other delegates opposedY Whatever later 
historians may write, no-one in the Labor party believed they had 
adopted protection, nor did they believe that New Protection was 
the same as protection. The most that can be said is that they were 
prepared to accept protection providing it was part of a package that 
delivered decent, court-controlled wages and conditions for workers 
in manufacturing, historically the site of "sweating". 
Indeed, it appears that the rejection of New Protection by the 
High Court led to a backlash against protectionism within the Labor 
party, a backlash which helped delay its formal acceptance until 1919 . 
Towards the end of the 1908 conference, the mover of the New 
Protection platform, Senator Givens, successfully moved for Labor 
to reimpose the excise taxes on Australian manufacturers which were 
part of Deakin's New Protection legislation, but without the 
(invalidated) exemption for businesses paying fair and reasonable 
wages - a measure which would entirely negate the protective 
element of the tariff.28 Givens was bitter towards the manufacturers 
who had benefited from protection, and then appealed to the High 
Court to avoid sharing those benefits with their employees. He was 
determined to force them to support change to the Constitution, 
arguing that: 
When Labour sought to secure an amendment of the Constitution to 
validate the New Protection, the manufacturers would no doubt be 
against them, but if the excise duties were re-enacted as taxation 
measures only, then, in order to escape that penalty, the manufacturers 
would no doubt be anxious to assist the passage of the New 
Protection. The manufacturers who had moved in this matter had 
broken faith with those who gave them increased protection.29 
In his thesis on socio-economic theory and practice of the 
parliamentary Labor party, David Stockley noted, "The star of the 
new protection had been much dulled for its committed followers 
by 1909."30 In Victoria in July 1910, the party's state executive 
expelled a prominent MLA, Martin Hannah, for setting up a new 
protectionist organisation which had begun lobbying the new 
federal Labor government for higher tariffs.3' 
In April 1911, the new federal Labor government proposed 
an extensive constitutional amendment which would, inter alia, have 
enabled the federal government to make protection conditional on 
the provision of court-determined wages and conditions. Labor's 
constitutional amendment was opposed by Deakin and the Fusion 
party and defeated at a referendum. With New Protection even more 
distant than before, there was a new attempt to get Labor to adopt 
protection at the next federal conference in 1912, which in itself 
undermines assertions that Labor had adopted protection in 1908. 
Delegate T. Chesson from Western Australia moved: "That plank 
No 2. - New Protection - be amended to read 'effective protection. ,,, 
The backlash caused by the High Court's invalidation can be seen in 
the speech made by the former Labor Prime Minister, Chris Watson, 
who 
... spoke as one who had advocated protection all along, and he did 
not think they were justified in disturbing the present 
plank ... personally he did not want much ofthe old idea of protection 
for the manufacturer only. To ask the people of Australia to make 
sacrifices to encourage industries that did not pay fair wages did not 
appeal to him ... 32 
This was the tone of the discussion in general and the move was 
defeated. However, by late 1914, with Labor back in office, Customs 
Minister Frank Tudor prepared a new set of tariffs, more protectionist 
than those in force, but the Tudor tariff was dropped under the 
pressure of war. Nevertheless, it was not until the 1919 conference 
that a resolution was carried: "That a tariff be put upon imports, 
with a view to encouraging and developing Australian industries. "33 
Even then the shadow of the High Court decision hung over the 
discussion, and there was opposition at the conference to protection 
on the basis that the tariff had led to high prices, and that the workers 
had not benefited in the way promised. This was not a resurgent free 
trade current; opposition to protectionism in 1912 and 1919 was 
argued from a class perspective. 
But what of Labor's parliamentary free traders? Did they, as is 
claimed, embrace protection in 1907 -8? When Yvonne Larsson came 
to discuss the 1907-8 tariff debate, she noted that some Labor 
members: 
. .. still chose to support free trade. Hughes and Fowler represented 
the workers' consumer interests in urban electorates while Poynton 
and Thomas Brown considered the small farmers' interests in rural 
electorates. Thomas, Mahon and Frazer representing mining 
interests ... 34 
Thus there were only one or two Labor free traders in the House of 
Representatives in 190 I who were not voting to lower tariffs in 1907-
8.35 Frazer and Poynton, who joined the Labor caucus after the 1903 
election, were still free traders in 1908, somewhat upsetting historical 
mythology. A reading of William Morris Hughes' "Case for Labour" 
columns in the Sydney Daily Telegraph 1908-10 will find a number 
written from a free trade standpoint.36 
But if Labor's free trade MPs did not accept protectionism in 
1908, it is equally true that free trade made no headway within the 
Labor party after federation. Certainly, George Reid's decision to 
redefine his party as anti-socialist and anti-Labor meant that free 
trade ideas were henceforth associated with Toryism.37 
The wider structure of free trade politics was also unappealing 
to Labor, reflecting as it did the interests of the most competitive 
sections of business such as pastoral production and mining. These 
employers were those most often involved in the most bitter and 
violent disputes with the labour movement.38 So where bourgeois 
free trade extolled the unfettered market as the deliverer of prosperity 
and were out to remove all restrictions on trade, Labor free 
traders wanted to impose limits on the labour market in 
particular. Indeed, George Pearce, one of the two Labor free 
traders in the Senate, described the Labor party's ideal as "the 
elimination of competition",39 and Labor free traders such as Pearce, 
Hughes and Fisher were amongst the most active demanding the 
total exclusion of Asian and African immigrants. 
In his unpublished biography of Pearce, John Merritt has given 
us an illuminating study of how one Labor free trader found his free 
trade beliefs undermined by his nationalism and racism, and his 
orientation to reform via the state. Merritt has constructed a narrative 
in which Pearce's free trade beliefs gradually fell apart as he came 
to deal with a range of nationalist political issues, such as the 
expulsion of islander labour from the sugar industry, the protection 
of white workers from "unfair competition", and defence.4o "While 
Pearce could argue rationally against protectionist theory," Merritt 
wrote, "he could not so readily oppose the broader protectionism 
inherent in Australian nationalism."4! 
When Labor moved in 190 I that Australian mail contracts should 
only be given for vessels employing white men, Pearce spoke in 
favour of this "protective" clause.42 The expUlsion ofIslander labour 
from the sugar industry, and measures to compensate the growers, 
led to four Commonwealth Acts between 1901 and 1905. Pearce 
was deeply embroiled in these controversies. He supported the 
expulsion ofIslanders, but initially opposed assistance to the industry, 
believing that most growers could survive without it. However when 
a bill was introduced in 1902, imposing an excise on sugar and a 
rebate for sugar grown using white labour, Pearce voted for it, as he 
did the following year when the rebate was converted into a sugar 
bonus. According to Merritt, Pearce felt 
... it was debatable whether compulsory withdrawal of cheap labour 
from the sugar industry involved excessive hardship for the growers 
and he [Pearce 1 suspected that at least the difficulties had been 
magnified. It rankled with him to think that the Government might 
be supporting uneconomic and inefficient productionY 
Through 1905, the growers agitated for an extension of the bonus, 
and a new trump card was played: some growers were now employing 
Chinese workers at low wages and competing successfully against 
their bonus-assisted rivals. Pearce responded angrily to this 
development, arguing that the sugar industry had no greater claim to 
protection from coloured labour within the Commonwealth than any 
other industry, and declaring that he would prefer a protective tariff 
on sugar rather than a bounty. His fellow West Australian free trader, 
Hugh Mahon, also fought against the bounty, and won a limitation 
on the period of its extension, to the considerable irritation of 
Queensland Labor MPS.44 Pearce moved an amendment to the bounty 
legislation to ensure that the growers who received the bounty paid 
decent wages - a formula which presaged New Protection.<5 Merritt 
comments that, "Pearce's approval of the excise rebate and the sugar 
bonus was reluctantly given for he knew both measures approximated 
to a form of protection."46 Thus even before Deakin had moved to 
implement it, the logic of Australian nationalism, and of trying to 
use the state to improve wages and working conditions, had drawn 
the free trader Pearce towards New Protection, and to preferring a 
tariff over a bounty (which was the traditional free trade proposal). 
When the legislation to protect the agricultural machinery industry 
was introduced into parliament, Pearce declared that: 
Although r am not a protectionist I look upon this as so important a 
departure in fiscal legislation that I am prepared to waive many of 
my fiscal objections in order to get it upon the statute bookY 
The heat was taken out of the tariff issue after 1908. Victorian 
manufacturers got most of the protection they were after when the 
Lyne tariff was passed, and after some initial hysteria, NSW 
exporters decided to accept higher tariffs in order to facilitate 
bourgeois political unity in the face of a rapidly growing Labor 
vote. The fusion of the three bourgeois parties/groups in May 1909 
was on an explicitly protectionist basis, and meant that formerly 
free trade MPs were now required to argue for the promotion of 
Australian industries through protection. Thus there was no longer 
any substantial bourgeois pressure on Labor to oppose higher tariffs, 
and in the short term there was little pressure on Labor to increase 
tariffs either. 
Deakin's attempt to implement New Protection did have a 
substantial impact on Labor's economic policy, because it showed 
the large number of fiscally uncommitted Labor MPs a way to use 
the state to regulate and guarantee minimum wages in manufacturing 
while protecting the employer from cheaper overseas imports. One 
measure of this success (and the decline of free trade as a focus of 
opinion within the party) is the eventual abandonment of Labor's 
platform for a referendum to decide the fiscal issue. In 1904 Labor 
MPs voted to enter an alliance with the radical protectionists led by 
Isaac Isaacs. All Labor's free traders voted against the alliance except 
Hughes. To mollify them and maintain party unity, the parliamentary 
party insisted that the fiscal issue should be put to a referendum.<s 
The referendum proposal was included in the Labor platform adopted 
by the 1905 federal conference,49 and was one of Labor's major 
policies at the 1906 election.50 Labor's caucus minutes show constant 
pressure by Pearce during the parliamentary session of 1907 to get 
caucus to make a decision on how to implement the policy, to no 
substantial effect.5! Labor's caucus minutes note a Referendum 
Committee report being presented to caucus on 20 November 1907, 
days after the Harvester judgment was brought down. "Several 
amendments were given notice of; Discussion ensued & debate 
adjourned on motion of F.G. Tudor." And that was the last it was 
mentioned in caucus. The tariff was passed in May 1908, and the 
referendum plank was removed from the Fighting Platform at the 
1908 conference after a brief discussion.52 
But the historical mythology that sees New Protection as the 
end of the debate within the labour movement is unsustainable. The 
High Court's decision to strike down Deakin's legislation saw a 
backlash against protection within the Labor Party, not least within 
its most protectionist branch. All the class-based objections to 
protection were brought back into focus: employers got the benefit, 
workers faced higher prices, and the movement was divided as "one 
section of workers ... make an arrangement with manufacturers for 
which all other workers will be obliged to pay".53 These class 
objections gained deeper roots within the party during the subsequent 
decade, as rising industrial militancy encouraged the growth of 
socialist and revolutionary ideas. The process by which Labor finally 
embraced protectionism was beyond the scope of my research. 
Certainly, the experience of rapid manufacturing development during 
the First World War, when overseas competition largely dried up, 
changed the minds of many bourgeois free traders, and we might 
expect that it had the same impact on Labor politicians. That would 
be a fruitful research project for the future. 
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